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ABSTRACT
The uncoordinated spectrum access problem is studied using a multi-player
multi-armed bandits framework. We consider a decentralized multi-player
stochastic multi-armed bandit model where the players cannot communicate
with each other and can observe only their own actions and rewards. Fur-
thermore, the environment may appear differently to different players, i.e.,
the reward distributions for a given arm may vary across players. Knowledge
of time horizon T is not assumed. Under these conditions, we consider two
settings - zero and non-zero reward on collision (when more than one player
plays the same arm). Under the zero reward on collision setting, we present
a policy that achieves expected regret of O(log T ) over a time horizon of
duration T . While settings with non-zero rewards on collisions and varying
reward distributions of arms across players have been considered separately
in prior work, a model allowing for both has not been studied previously to
the best of our knowledge. With this setup, we present a policy that achieves
expected regret of order O(log2+δ T ) for some 0 < δ < 1 over a time horizon
of duration T .
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The multi-armed bandit is a well-studied framework to model sequential
decision-making problems with an inherent exploration-exploitation trade-
off. Multi-armed bandits have applications in recommendation systems, ad-
vertising, ranking results of search engines, and more. The classical stochastic
multi-armed bandit setup considers an agent/player, who at each time in-
stant t, chooses an action from a finite set of actions (or arms). The agent
receives a reward drawn from an unknown distribution associated with the
arm chosen. The goal is to come up with a decision-making policy that
maximizes the agent’s cumulative reward or equivalently minimizes regret.
Policies that are designed to minimize regret in bandit settings aim to achieve
sub-linear regret with respect to the time horizon T . The multi-armed bandit
problem was first considered in the context of clinical trials by Thompson [1],
who introduced a posterior sampling heuristic commonly known as Thomp-
son sampling. In their seminal work, Lai and Robbins [2] formalized the
stochastic multi-armed bandit setting and provided a lower bound on regret
of order Ω(log T ) for time horizon T . They also presented an asymptotically
optimal decision policy that introduced the idea of upper confidence bounds,
which was further explored by [3] and [4]. Other variants of the multi-armed
bandit setup such as adversarial, contextual and Markovian have also been
studied in literature [5, 6].
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the study of multi-player
multi-armed bandit settings, where instead of a single agent, there are K
agents simultaneously pulling the arms. Depending on the level of coordi-
nation between players, various policies have been proposed to cooperatively
find the best arm or to maximize the sum of rewards of all players. Multi-
player bandit setups where agents cooperate have applications in geograph-
ically distributed ad servers [7], peer-to-peer networks [8], and distributed
recommendation systems [9]. Cesa-Bianchi et al. [7] study a multi-player
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adversarial bandit setting and [9] considers a multi-player contextual linear
bandit setting.
Multi-player stochastic multi-armed bandit settings are particularly rele-
vant to cognitive radio and dynamic spectrum access systems. In these sys-
tems, the finite number of channels representing different frequency bands are
treated as arms, the users in the network are treated as the players, and the
data rates received from the channels can be interpreted as the rewards. Since
the maximum rate that can be received from a channel is limited, assuming
bounded rewards for the arms is justified. Current spectrum management
protocols treat frequency spectrum as a fixed commodity, which leads to spec-
trum underutilization. Dynamic spectrum access techniques have emerged
as good strategies to improve spectrum utilization. Existing techniques for
dynamic spectrum access have focused primarily on the primary/secondary
user paradigm, where secondary users detect vacant bandwidths when avail-
able and vacate the occupied channel when a primary user wants to transmit.
In this work, we consider the uncoordinated spectrum access model, where
there is no such hierarchy among users and users are not allowed to commu-
nicate with each other. In this setting, players are competing for the same
set of finite resources, and the expected regret is defined with respect to the
optimal assignment of arms that maximizes the sum of expected rewards of
all players (which can be interpreted as the system performance). The event
of multiple players pulling the same arm simultaneously is commonly referred
to as a collision and leads to players receiving reduced or zero rewards. Thus,
while designing policies for the multi-player setting, in addition to balancing
the exploration-exploitation trade-off, it is important to control the number
of collisions that occur.
In the presence of a central controller in a multi-player system, the prob-
lem reduces to a single agent multi-armed bandit setup where the agent can
choose multiple arms at a time. However, due to the communication over-
head placed by a central controller, it is important to study a decentralized
system. A tight (in the order sense) lower bound for the system regret for the
centralized case is of course the same as that for a single agent multi-armed
bandit setup, i.e., Ω(log T ), which also serves as a lower bound on system
regret for the decentralized case. It should be noted that no larger lower
bounds have been proven for the decentralized case.
Some of the prior work in the decentralized setting assumes that commu-
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nication between players is possible [10, 11]. However cooperation through
communication between players imposes an additional cost and may suffer
from latency issues due to delays. Other works assume that sensing occurs
at the level of every individual player, such as smart devices in a network
being able to sense if a channel is being used or not without transmitting
on it. The work in [12] considers such a setting where a distributed auction
algorithm is used by players to come to a consensus on the optimal assign-
ment of arms. However in other systems, such as emerging architectures in
Internet of Things (IoT), the individual nodes are not capable of sensing.
This motivates the study of a completely distributed scenario, where there
is no central control and the players cannot communicate with each other in
any manner. The players can observe only their own actions and rewards.
In the fully distributed setting with no communication, in most of prior
work in literature, the assumption is made that the reward distribution for
any arm is the same across all players (homogeneous setting). This setting
was first considered in [13], where prior knowledge of number of players is
not assumed. The algorithm presented, named Multi-user ε-Greedy collision
Avoiding algorithm (MEGA), combines the probabilistic ε-greedy algorithm
with a collision avoiding mechanism inspired by the ALOHA protocol, and
provides guarantees of sub-linear regret. Rosenski et al. [14] proposed an
algorithm named Musical Chairs (MC), that is composed of a learning phase
for the players to learn an ε-correct ranking of arms and number of players
and a ‘Musical Chairs’ phase, in which the K players fix on the top K
arms. They provide high probability guarantees of constant regret. The fully
distributed setting with homogeneous reward distributions across players is
also considered in [15, 16, 17]. All the above mentioned works also assume
that in the event of a collision, all the colliding players receive zero rewards.
In cognitive radio and uncoordinated spectrum access networks, users are
usually not colocated physically, and thus the reward distributions for a
given arm may vary across users (heterogeneous setting). There have been
few works that study the heterogeneous setting. Kalathil et al. [12] and
Tibrewal et al. [18] consider such a setup, although they assume that the
players are capable of sensing (i.e., players can observe whether an arm is
being used or not without pulling it). However, such an assumption might
be unrealistic for the uncoordinated spectrum access problem.
In the first part of this thesis, we consider a fully distributed setting where
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players can observe only their own actions and rewards, and allow for het-
erogeneous reward distributions. In the event of a collision, colliding players
get zero rewards. The work in [19] considers such a fully distributed setting,
and the proposed algorithm achieves a regret of O(log2 T ). The work in [16]
introduces the idea of using forced collisions as a way to communicate among
the users in the homogeneous setting where the reward distributions for the
channels are the same across users. In this part of our work, we use the
idea of forced collisions in the heterogeneous case and present a policy that
achieves expected regret of O(log T ). The algorithm presented here was de-
veloped independently of the work in [20], where an approach similar to ours
is explored, i.e., a fully distributed setting with user dependent rewards and
with zero reward on collision. However, while the algorithm presented in [20]
achieves logarithmic regret only in the case of a unique optimal matching,
our policy results in logarithmic regret even in the case of multiple optimal
matchings.
Another assumption that needs to be closely examined is that of zero
rewards on collisions. In practical scenarios, when more than one player
transmits on a channel in an uncoordinated wireless network, the colliding
players may receive reduced, and not necessarily zero, rates or rewards. Thus
allowing for non-zero rewards on collisions results in a more realistic model.
Bande and Veeravalli [21] have considered a setting with homogeneous reward
distributions across players and non-zero rewards on collisions. They also
allow for the number of players to be greater than the number of arms. The
algorithm presented in [21] is an extension of the Musical Chairs algorithm
by [14] and provides high probability guarantees of constant regret. In the
second part of this thesis, we study a multi-player multi-armed bandit setup
which allows for heterogeneous reward distributions and non-zero rewards on
collisions. We also allow for the number of players to be greater than the
number of arms. Our work is based on [22] and, in contrast to the work
in [19], requires modifications to results in [22] to accommodate non-zero
rewards on collisions. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to
consider a model that allows for both heterogeneous reward distributions and
non-zero rewards on collisions. In this setting, we propose an algorithm that
achieves sub-linear regret of O(log2+δ T ) for a time horizon T , with 0 < δ < 1.
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CHAPTER 2
ZERO REWARD ON COLLISION
2.1 System Model
We consider the scenario of a multi-user game involving K users and M
channels as the arms in a stochastic multi-armed bandit setup. We assume
that K < M and that the rewards for the channels are bounded in [0, 1]. Let
the mean reward for user j on channel m be denoted by µj(m). Consider a
time horizon T , and let the action taken by user (arm chosen by the user)
j at time t ≤ T be at,j. In the case of a collision, i.e., when multiple users
access the same channel, all the colliding users receive zero reward.
Let A(K,M) denote all the possible user channel matchings, i.e., a =
[a1, a2, ..., aK ] ∈ A(K,M), with aj denoting the action taken by user j. Since
we assume that colliding users get zero rewards, we only consider matchings
that are unique, i.e., once for which all the users are assigned to distinct
arms. Let a∗ ∈ A(K,M) be such that





Define J1 to be the system reward for the optimal matching, i.e., J1 =∑K
j=1 µj(a
∗
j), and J2 to be the system reward for the second optimal matching.
In our algorithm, we assume that we have access to a lower bound on the





Note that this quantity is strictly positive even in the case of multiple optimal
matchings.
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The expected regret of the system is defined as













where the expectation is over the actions of the players.
2.2 Algorithm
We assume that the players are time synchronized and that they enter the
system at t = 0. The algorithm proceeds in epochs for each user. This allows
us to proceed without knowing the time horizon T . Each epoch has three
phases.
The first phase is the exploration phase, which has two parts. The first
part is the fixing phase and is done for each user to obtain a unique ID. Each
user accesses the arms uniformly and once a free arm is found, i.e., non-zero
reward is received, that arm is played for the rest of the fixing phase. The
channel numbers they settle on serve as their IDs. At the end of the fixing
phase, the users that are not fixed occupy channel 1, and the fixed users
access channel 1 in order of their IDs sequentially. If the fixed users do not
face a collision during this step, all users have obtained unique IDs. Once
all the users obtain unique IDs, say at epoch `f , this part of the exploration
phase is no longer done from epoch `f +1. The second part of the exploration
phase is for the users to get estimates of the mean rewards of the arms. The
users start from the channels corresponding to their IDs, and sample each
arm for γ time units in a round-robin fashion.
The second phase is the matching phase and its purpose is for the users
to arrive at the optimal matching. The first part of the matching phase is
for each user to communicate their estimates of the mean rewards of all the
channels to the other users. The users transmit the estimated mean rewards
µ̂j(m) for all the channels in the order of their IDs. Since the players are
not allowed to directly communicate with each other, collisions are used as
a way to exchange information among players. The use of forced collisions
as a form of communication was introduced in [16]. The main idea is that
there are M channels available to the users and the transmitting user j
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occupies a certain channel. When the receiving users access the channels
one at a time, the channel number on which they face a collision gives them
information about what was being transmitted. The value of the estimate
µ̂j(m) that each user has received at the end of the matching phase is denoted
by µ̂j(m). Note that this is similar to truncating the value of µ̂j(m) to a finite
number of bits as µ̂j(m). At the end of the first part of the matching phase,
|µ̂j(m) − µ̂j(m)| ≤ ∆/2 for j ∈ [K] and m ∈ [M ] given that all the users
have a unique ID.
Once this communication part of the matching phase is completed, each
user has the same approximated values of estimated mean rewards. Each user
then independently solves for the set of optimal matchings from the matrix of
µ̂j(m) values. If there is a unique optimal matching, the users play the arm
according to that matching for the exploitation phase. If there are multiple
optimal matchings, it is necessary for each user to choose the same optimal
matching from this set. This is achieved in the following manner. The user
with ID number one chooses one of the optimal matchings and occupies that
channel. The remaining users access the M channels in order of their IDs
to get the channel number chosen by the user with ID one and update the
set of optimal matchings that correspond with the channel chosen by user
one. This process is repeated until all the users settle on the same optimal
matching. This matching is played by all the users for the exploitation phase.
In our algorithm, the estimated mean rewards of all the channels are com-
municated to each user through the idea of forced collisions, and hence all
the users can independently solve the assignment problem to arrive at the
same set of optimal matchings. However, in [20], the communication mecha-
nism is adapted from [16], where a leader-follower protocol is employed. The
followers send the values of estimated mean rewards to the leader, and the
leader computes the matching that has to be played by the users. While the
algorithm presented here gives guarantees of logarithmic regret for the cases
of unique optimal matching and multiple optimal matchings, the work in [20]
provides guarantees of logarithmic regret only for unique optimal matchings
and quasi-logarithmic regret in the case of multiple optimal matchings. Note
that the constants in the upper bound for average regret of our algorithm
are comparable to the ones obtained in [20].
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Algorithm 1: Decentralized MUMAB Algorithm
Initialization: Set µ̂j(m) = 0 for all values of j ∈ [K] and all
m ∈ [M ] and LT as the last epoch with time horizon T.
for ` = 1, ..., LT do
Exploration phase:
Fixing phase : Access channels uniformly for Tf time units till
find a channel with no collision; fix on that for remainder of
sub-phase. The channel number fixed on serves as unique ID.
If not fixed during fixing phase, send a flag by occupying channel
1.
If fixed during part fixing phase, access channel 1 in order of ID.
Once all users are fixed, skip fixing phase.
Access each channel in a round robin fashion for γ time units to
get estimates µ̂j(m).
Matching phase: Enter the matching algorithm to convey the
estimates to all users, receive their estimates and calculate the
optimal matching.
Exploitation phase: Occupy the channel resulting from the
matching algorithm for 2` time units.
end
2.3 Regret Analysis
Theorem 1. Assuming the rewards of each channel for all users are bounded
in [0, 1] and i.i.d. for all t ≤ T for a time horizon T and ∆ = J1−J2
2M
is known,
the regret of the decentralized MUMAB algorithm is O(log T )
Proof. The regret incurred during the LT epochs can be analyzed as the
sum of the regrets incurred in the three stages of the algorithm. From the
structure of the epochs, we have that LT < log T .
1. Exploration phase: Let the regret incurred during the exploration phase
for all epochs be R1. The exploration goes on for Tf + K + γM time
units till epoch `f (when all the users get fixed) and for γM time units
after that. Choosing Tf = M log(20K) and γ =
1
2∆2






















Algorithm 2: Matching Algorithm for user i
Initialization: Transmit in order of ID.
for Transmitting user j′ = 1, ..., K do
If turn to transmit, transmit µ̂j′(m) for m = 1, ...,M as:
Occupy channel h1 = dMµ̂j′(m)e for M time units.





)e for M time units for





If not turn to transmit, in order of IDs:
Access channels in round robin fashion and initialize the















Calculate the set SM of optimal matchings with values of estimates.
if SM is a singleton set then
Assign channel according to the optimal matching.
else
User 1 chooses one of the optimal matchings.
Remaining users update their set of optimal matchings
accordingly.
Similar mechanism for subsequent users allows users to settle on
one of the optimal matchings.
end
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2. Matching phase: Let the regret incurred during the matching phase be





+ (M − k)M2 +M3 when





+ (M − k)M2





















3. Exploitation phase: Let R3 denote the regret incurred during the ex-
ploitation phase. Regret is incurred in the exploitation phase in epoch
` only in case of the following two events:
(a) The users do not get a unique ID in the first part of the exploration
phase. Let P`(A) denote the probability that after the exploration
phase of epoch ` the users do not have a unique ID
(b) Given that users have unique IDs, for some j ∈ [k] and some
m ∈ [M ], |µ̂j(m)−µj(m)| > ∆. Let P`(B) denote the probability
of this event.




2`(P`(A) + P`(B)). (2.3)
Let pf denote the probability that with the fixing phase running for
Tf time units, all users are fixed. From Lemma 1 of [16], we have that
pf ≥ (1−Ke
Tf
M ). From the definition of the event A, we have that
P`(A) = (1− pf )`. (2.4)













We therefore get the first term of R3 to be bounded by a finite number.
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Let F denote the event that in epoch ` all the users have unique IDs.
This means that in some epoch `f ∈ 0, 1, ..., `− 1, the system was fixed.
Thus
P`(B)















2γipf (1− pf )i−1.
(2.6)
Choosing Tf = M log(20K) gives pf >
3(e−1)
2e














































log T + C
= O(log T ).
(2.10)
2.4 Experimental Results
In this section, we present experimental results to validate the performance of
our algorithm. We applied the proposed algorithm to a system with K = 10
users and M = 10 channels. Figure 2.1 shows the plot of average accumulated
regret across the time horizon. The algorithm was run for 10 epochs. We see
from Figure 2.1 that the average accumulated regret grows sub-linearly with
time and the regret is bounded by log T .
Figure 2.1: Average accumulated regret vs. time
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CHAPTER 3
NON-ZERO REWARDS ON COLLISIONS
3.1 System Setting
Consider the set of agents/players [K] = {1, 2, . . . , K}. The action space of
each player j is the set of M arms Aj = [M ]. Let the time horizon be denoted
by T , and the action taken by player j at time t ≤ T be at,j. The strategy or
action profile at is defined as the vector of the actions taken by the players,
i.e., at = [at,1, ..., at,K ]. At any given time, the players can observe only their
own rewards and cannot observe the actions taken by the other players.
In this model, we assume the reward distribution of each arm to have
support [0, 1]. In the event that more than one player accesses the same
arm m, they could get non-zero rewards. Let k(at,j) denote the number
of players playing arm at,j (including player j). Note that the number of
players on arm at,j is a function of the complete action profile at. The
reward received by player j pulling arm m, that is pulled by k(m) players, is
denoted by rj(m, k(m)). The reward is drawn from a distribution with mean
µj(m, k(m)) = E [rj(m, k(m))]. The mean reward of an arm µj(m, k(m)) is
inversely proportional to the number of players pulling the arm (k(m)). We
assume that µj(m, k(m)) becomes negligible for some k(m) ≥ N + 1 where
N depends on the system, i.e., µj(m, k(m)) = 0 for k(m) ≥ N +1. When we
assume zero rewards on collisions, it is equivalent to assuming that N = 1.
The action space A of the players is simply the product space of the indi-
vidual action spaces, i.e., A = ΠKj=1Aj. Let a∗ ∈ A be such that





In this work, we consider the case where there is a unique optimal match-






j)) be the system reward for the optimal
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matching, and J2 the system reward for the second optimal matching. In our




Such an assumption is usually required for the analysis of multi-player MABs
when communication between players is not allowed [19, 12]. The expected
regret during a time horizon T is defined as:















where the expectation is over the actions of the players.
For a given arm m, each player j needs to estimate the mean reward
µj(m,n) for all n ∈ [N ]. In the case where N = 1 (zero rewards on colli-
sions), player j estimates µj(m, 1) using all the non-zero rewards obtained.
However, when N ≥ 2, estimating µj(m,n) for n ∈ [N ] is not very straight-
forward. In order to achieve this and provide some guarantees on the esti-
mation performance, it is necessary to impose a separability condition on the
mean rewards as a function of n for any j ∈ [K] and m ∈ [M ]. We use the
following separability condition derived from Definition 1 of [23]:
|µj(m,n1)− µj(m,n2)| ≥ 4c
√
σ2 + ε2
where j ∈ [K], m ∈ [M ], n1, n2 ∈ [β], ε2 ∈ (0, 1), σ2 is the maximum variance
of the reward distributions across arms and c is a constant dependent on K
and M . A detailed analysis on how we arrive at this condition is provided




where n1, n2 ∈ [N ], µj(m,n1), µj(m,n2) 6= 0, j ∈ [K] and m ∈ [M ].
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3.2 Algorithm
Our proposed policy for each player j in the decentralized multi-player multi-
armed bandit setting with non-zero rewards on collisions is presented in Al-
gorithm 3. The policy for a player depends only on the player’s own actions
and the observed rewards. Our algorithm proceeds in epochs since we do not
assume knowledge of time horizon T . Let LT denote the number of epochs
in time horizon T . Each epoch ` has three phases: Exploration, Matching
and Exploitation.
The exploration phase is for player j to obtain estimates of mean rewards
(denoted by µ̂j(m,n)) of arms m ∈ [M ] for all n ∈ [N ]. This phase proceeds
for T0 (expression given in Section 3.3) time units in every epoch. At each
time instant t, player j chooses an arm m uniformly from the M arms and
stores the reward received. At the end of T0 time units, player j runs a
clustering algorithm (Algorithm 5) on the rewards received while playing arm
m, for each m separately. We know that the mean rewards µj(m,n) from
n = 1 to n = N are decreasing in n. The estimates µ̂j(m,n), n = 1, . . . , N
are calculated as the centroids of the clusters sorted in descending order.
Once the players have estimates of the mean rewards on the arms, they
need to come to a consensus on the optimal action profile that maximizes
the system reward. This is done in the matching phase of each epoch. The
parameter ε is provided as an input to the algorithm. Given an action profile
a, we define the utility of player j to be
uj(a) = µ̂j(aj, k(aj)).
Section 3.4 explains in detail the matching phase and the choice of the above
defined utility function. The matching phase of our proposed algorithm is
based on [22], where a decentralized algorithm that leads to maximizing the
sum of utilities of the players is presented. This phase proceeds for c2cε`
1+δ
time units in epoch `, where c2 and cε are constants. At the end of this phase,
the players identify the optimal action profile with high probability.
The optimal action profile identified at the end of the matching phase is
played in the exploitation phase for c32
` time units. As ` increases, the players
get better estimates of the mean rewards and the probability of identifying
the optimal action profile increases. Therefore, the length of the exploitation
15
phase is set to be exponential in `.
Algorithm 3: Policy for player j
Initialization: Set µ̂j(m,n) = 0 for all j ∈ [K], m ∈ [M ] and n ∈ [N ].
Initialize empty arrays rj,m for m ∈ [M ]. Let LT be the last epoch with
time horizon T
for epoch ` = 1 to LT do
Exploration phase:
for t = 1 to T0 do
Choose an arm m uniformly
Append reward to rj,m
end for
Obtain µ̂j(m,n) for n ∈ [N ] by running Cluster (Algorithm 3) on rj,m
for each m
Matching phase: Run Algorithm 2. Starting from
d = d0.5c2cε`1+δe-th turn of Algorithm 2, count the number of times





Exploitation phase: For c32
` time units, play




Theorem 2. Given the system model specified in Section 3.1, the regret
of the proposed algorithm for a time-horizon T and some 0 < δ < 1 is
R(T ) = O(log2+δ T ).
Proof. Let LT be the last epoch with time-horizon T . The regret incurred
during the LT epochs can be analyzed as the sum of the regret incurred in
the three phases of the algorithm. From the structure of the algorithm, we
can easily see that LT < log T . Let R1, R2 and R3 denote the regret incurred
during the exploration phase, matching phase and exploitation phase during
LT epochs, respectively.
1. Exploration phase: Since the exploration phase in each epoch ` pro-
ceeds for T0 time units,
R1 ≤ T0LT ≤ T0 log(T ). (3.2)
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Algorithm 4: Matching phase algorithm
Initialization: Let c > MN . Z1 = [ā1,j, ū1,j, S1,j], where ā1,j
unif∼ [M ],
ū1,j = 0 and S1,j = D
for h = 1 to c2`
1+δ do
Action dynamics:
If Sh,j = C, action
aj =
{
āh,j with prob 1− εc
a ∈ [M ] \ āh,j with uniform prob ε
c
M−1
If Sh,j = D, action aj is chosen uniformly from [M ]
Estimate utility: Upon choosing action aj, play it for cε time units
and let sample mean of the rewards observed during this duration be
r̄(aj). If r̄(aj) = 0, ûj = 0. Else let
k̂(aj) = arg min
n∈[N ],µ̂j(aj ,n) 6=0
|r̄(aj)− µ̂j(aj, n)|
The utility of the player is calculated as:
ûj = µ̂j(aj, k̂(aj))
State Dynamics:
If Sh,j = C and [aj, ûj] = [āh,j, ūh,j]:
Zh+1 = Zh
If Sh,j = C and [aj, ûj] 6= [āh,j, ūh,j] or Sh,j = D, the new state
Zh+1 =
{
[aj, ûj, C] with prob ε
1−ûj





Use an α approximation algorithm to select an initial set of N centroids
C0 = {ν1, . . . νN}
while Lloyd’s algorithm (k-means) has not converged do
Run k-means step update
end while
Return centroids of clusters
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1+δ ≤ c2cεL2+δT ≤ c2cε log
2+δ T. (3.3)
3. Exploitation phase: In the exploitation phase, regret is incurred in the
following two events:
(a) Let E1 denote the event that for some player j, armm and n ∈ [N ],
we have that |µj(m,n) − µ̂j(m,n)| ≥ ∆. Let probability of this
event be P (E1).
(b) Let E`2 denote the event that given that all players have |µj(m,n)−
µ̂j(m,n)| ≤ ∆, the action profile chosen in the matching phase of
epoch ` is not optimal. Let probability of this event for some
epoch ` be P (E`2).
We have from Lemma 1 that by choosing an appropriately large T0,















R(T ) = R1 +R2 +R3
≤ T0 log T + c2cε log2+δ T +
2c3(cexp + Cρ)
2 + e




The exploration phase is for player j to obtain estimates of mean rewards
of arms m ∈ [M ] for all n ∈ [N ]. The players explore the arms uniformly
and the estimated mean rewards for each arm m are calculated separately by
running a clustering algorithm (Algorithm-3) on the rewards obtained while
pulling arm m. The estimated rewards µ̂j(m,n) for n = 1 to N are calculated
as the centroids of the clusters sorted in descending order. Algorithm 3 is
derived from Algorithm 1 of [23].
Lemma 1. Given ∆ as defined in Section 3.1, for any fixed player j, arm m,
and number of players on the arm n ≤ N , the estimates of the mean rewards
µ̂j(m,n) obtained after the exploration phase of epoch ` for the choice of
T0 ≥ d 32M
K
(M−1)(K−N)∆2 e, satisfy
P (|µ̂j(m,n)− µj(m,n)| ≥ ∆) ≤ cexpe−` (3.6)
where cexp is a constant that depends only on M,K,N .
Proof of this lemma is provided in the Appendix A and closely follows the
proof of Theorem 2 of [23] and Theorem 2 of [21]. For a given player j and
arm m, we first prove a lower bound on the number of samples obtained from
each cluster. We then use the results from [23] along with the separability
condition and appropriate concentration inequalities to prove the lemma.
3.4 Matching Phase
Strategic form games in game theory are used to model situations where
players choose actions simultaneously and do not have knowledge of the ac-
tions of other players. In such games, each player has a utility function
uj : A → [0, 1], that assigns a real valued payoff to each action profile a ∈ A.
An algorithm that works under the assumption that every agent can observe
only their own action and utility received is called a pay-off based method.
The matching phase of our proposed algorithm is based on [22], where a
pay-off based decentralized algorithm that leads to maximizing the sum of
utilities of the players is presented. In order to pose the multi-player multi-
armed bandit problem as a strategic form game, we need to design the utility
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functions of the players in a way such that the system regret is minimized.
Consider the utility of player j associated with the action profile a to be
denoted by uj(a). We define the utility as:
uj(a) = µ̂j(aj, k(aj)).
The action profile that maximizes the sum of utilities is called an efficient
action profile. We have from Lemma 1 of [19] that if
|µ̂j(m,n)− µj(m,n)| ≤ ∆ (3.7)











While Lemma 1 of [19] provides a proof under the assumption of zero rewards
on collisions, a similar proof can be worked out for the case of non-zero
rewards on collisions. The condition given by (3.7) is guaranteed with high
probability by the exploration phase of the algorithm. Thus, the efficient
action profile that maximizes the sum of utilities (estimated mean rewards) is
the same as the optimal action profile that minimizes regret or, equivalently,
maximizes system performance.
3.4.1 Description of algorithm
This phase proceeds in ‘plays’, where each play lasts cε time units and ε
is a parameter of the algorithm. Each player j is associated with a state
Zh = [āh,j, ūh,j, Sh,j] during play h, where āh,j ∈ [M ] is the baseline action of
the player, ūh,j ∈ [0, 1] is the baseline utility of the player and Sh,j ∈ {C,D}
is the mood of the player (C denotes “content” and D denotes “discontent”).
When the player is content, the baseline action is chosen with high proba-
bility (1−εc) and every other action is chosen with uniform probability. If the
player is discontent, the action is chosen uniformly from all arms and there
is a high probability that the player would choose an arm different from the
baseline action. This part of the algorithm constitutes the action dynamics.
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The baseline action can be interpreted as the arm the agent expects to play
in the efficient action profile and the baseline utility can be interpreted as the
pay-off the player expects to receive upon playing the baseline action. The
player being content is an indication that the payoff received by the player by
playing his baseline action is satisfactory and as expected. Thus, the goal in
designing the algorithm is for all the players to align the baseline actions and
baseline utilities to the efficient action profile and be content in this state.
We have seen the justification for using the utility function uj(a) = µ̂j(aj, k(aj))
in the introduction of Section 3.4. However, at each time instant in the
matching phase, the player receives only the instantaneous reward and does
not know k(at,j) corresponding to the action profile chosen in the previous
step, in order to determine the utility. Thus, we estimate the k(at,j) as k̂(aj)
and uj(a) as ûj(a). This is done by the player pulling the arm chosen in
the action dynamics for cε time units and recording the sample mean of the
rewards observed during this duration as r̄j(aj). The estimate k̂(aj) is given
by:
k̂(aj) = arg min
n∈[N ],µ̂j(aj ,n)6=0
|r̄(aj)− µ̂j(aj, n)|
and ûj(a) = µ̂j(aj, k̂(aj)).





e, we have that
pε = P (uj(a) 6= ûj(a)) ≤ εc.
The proof follows directly from Hoeffding’s inequality. Thus, we have an
estimate of the utility of the player that is correct with high probability. Note
that in Algorithm 4, ûj(a) is referred to as just ûj for readability.
The player updates his current state by comparing the action played and
the estimate of the utility received with his baseline action and baseline
utility. If the player is content and his baseline action and utility match the
action played and the estimate of the utility, the state remains the same.
Otherwise, the next state is chosen probabilistically based on the estimate of
the utility. The rationale behind the particular probabilities chosen is that
when the utility received is high, the player is more probable to be content.
The utility each player receives is equivalent to feedback from the system
on how the entire action profile affects the reward received by this player. If
the player receives a lower payoff due to that arm not being good or due to
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collisions, there is a higher probability of the player becoming discontent and
exploring other arms. On the other hand, if the payoff received is higher,
there is a higher probability of the player staying content and exploiting the
same arm again. Thus the agent dynamics and state dynamics balance the
exploration exploitation trade-off in the multi-player bandit setting.
From the d = c2cε`
1+δ-th play of the matching phase algorithm, the player





The action chosen by the player for the exploitation phase is
aj = arg max
m
W `(j,m).
3.4.2 Analysis of the matching phase algorithm
The matching phase algorithm is based on the work in [22], and the guaran-
tees provided there state that the action profile achieving the optimal sum of
utilities is played for a majority of the time. The analysis of the algorithm in
[22] relies on the theory of regular perturbed Markov decision processes [24].
The dynamics of the matching phase algorithm induce a Markov chain
over the state space Z = ΠKj=1([M ] × [0, 1] ×M) where M = {C,D}. Let
P 0 denote the probability transition matrix of the process when ε = 0 and
P ε denote the transition matrix when ε > 0. The process P ε is a regular
perturbed Markov process if for any z, z′ ∈ Z (Equations (6),(7) and (8) of
Appendix of [24]):






3. P εzz′ > 0 implies for some ε, there exists r ≥ 0 such that 0 < limε→0 ε−rP εzz′ <
∞
The value of r satisfying the third condition is called the resistance of the
transition z → z′, denoted by r(z → z′).
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Let µε be the unique stationary distribution of P ε, where P ε is a regular
perturbed Markov process. Then limε→0 µ
ε exists and the limiting distribu-
tion µ0 is a stationary distribution of P 0. The stochastically stable states
are the support of µ0. The main result of [22] (Theorem 1) states that the
stochastically stable states maximize the sum of utilities of the players. Our
matching phase algorithm differs from [22] in two aspects. We prove that,
in spite of those differences, the conditions required in their paper to prove
their result are still satisfied, and thus the stochastically stable states of our
matching phase algorithm maximize the sum of the utilities of the players.
It can be easily verified that the algorithm presented in [22] satisfies the
conditions for regular perturbed Markov process. The transitions where
P εzz′ > 0 and limε→0 P
ε
zz′ = 0 are called ε perturbations. The first way in
which our algorithm differs from the one in [22] is that the players in our
algorithm do not directly observe their utilities. Instead they estimate their
utilities, and there is a probability of error of pε in this step. However, this
can be represented as an ε perturbation by rewriting the state update step
as follows (for readability, the index of the play h is dropped in the following
equations):
If Sj = C:
If [aj, ûj] = [āj, ūj], the new state is
[āj, ūj, C]→

[āj, ūj, C] w.p. 1− pε
[āj, uj, C], w.p. pε(ε
1−uj)
[āj, uj, D], w.p. pε(1− ε1−uj).
(3.8)
If [aj, ûj] 6= [āj, ūj], with q < 1
[āj, ūj, C]→

[āj, ūj, C] w.p. qpε
[aj, uj, C], w.p. (1− qpε)(ε1−uj)
[aj, uj, D], w.p. (1− qpε)(1− ε1−uj).
(3.9)




[aj, uj, C] w.p. (1− pε)ε1−uj
[aj, uj, D], w.p. (1− pε)(1− ε1−uj)
[aj, ûj, C], w.p. pεε
1−ûj
[aj, ûj, D], w.p. pε(1− ε1−ûj).
(3.10)
We have from Lemma 2 that pε ≤ εc. Thus we can see that the unperturbed
process is the same as in [22] and it can be easily verified that these dynamics
satisfy the conditions for a regular perturbed Markov chain specified in [24].
The second way in which our dynamics differ from [22] is that our strategic
form game is not interdependent (Definition 1 of [22]). The interdependence
property implies that it is not possible to divide the agents into two distinct
subsets, where the actions of agents in one subset do not affect the utilities
of those in the other. However, in our case, consider an action profile where
N+1 players play an arm m. These N+1 players will receive zero utility, no
matter what the other players play. Thus, our game is not interdependent.
The only time this property is used in [22] is to find the recurrence classes
of P 0. We can prove that our dynamics produce the same recurrence classes
as in [22] using the structure of our algorithm.
Lemma 3. Let D0 represent the set of states in which everyone is discontent.
Let C0 represent the set of states in which each agent is content and the
benchmark action and utility are aligned. Then the recurrence classes of the
unperturbed process are D0 and all singletons z ∈ C0 .
The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Let D be any state in D0 and z, z′ ∈ C0. It can be seen that the resistances
for the paths z → D, D → z and z → z′ in our algorithm are the same as
in [22]. For instance, the transition from z → D occurs only when a player
explores or the utility is miscalculated. Since we have pε ≤ εc, the probability
of this event is O(εc) and hence the resistance of the transition is c. Similarly
it can be seen that the resistance for the path D → z is (K −
∑
j∈[K] ūj) and
z → z′ is bounded in [c.2c).
Thus, we can use the proof of Theorem 1 of [22] to say that the stochas-
tically stable states of our matching phase algorithm maximize the sum of
utilities. A more detailed explanation of the same is provided in Appendix
B. Since we assume a unique optimal action profile, the state with the base-
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line actions and utilities corresponding to the optimal action profile and all
players being content is the stochastically stable state. Since this state is
played for a majority of the time, we can bound the probability of the opti-
mal action profile not being identified at the end of the matching phase as
in the following result.
Lemma 4. In some epoch `, let a∗ = arg maxa∈A
∑K




K ] where a
′
j = arg max
m∈[M ]
W `(j,m) at some epoch `. For small enough
ε,
P (a∗ 6= a′) ≤ Cρ exp (−`1+δ)
for some Cρ > 0.
The proof relies on using Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds for Markov chains
(Theorem 3 of [25]) and is provided in Appendix B.
3.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we present the results of simulations carried out to validate
the performance of our algorithm. We consider two cases, one with K = M
and the other with K > M . In both cases, we allow for maximum of 2
players on each arm (N = 2). The mean rewards µj(m, 1) for player j, arm
m are generated uniformly at random from [0.3, 0.95]. The mean rewards
µj(m, 2) are generated as µj(m, 2) = 0.5µj(m, 1) + u, where u is a uniform
random variable in [−0.05, 0.05]. The rewards are generated from a uniform
distribution with variance 0.003. In our simulations, we set δ = 0. The
values of mean rewards for each case is provided in Appendix C.
Due to numerical considerations, we modify the probabilities in (3.1) as
εu
max
j −ûj and 1 − εumaxj −ûj instead of ε1−ûj and 1 − ε1−ûj , where umaxj is the
maximum utility that can be received by the player.
To the best of our knowledge, the setting we have considered that allows
for heterogeneous reward distributions and non-zero rewards on collisions has
not been studied prior to this work. Thus, it is not possible to compare our
algorithms against existing algorithms.
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3.5.1 K = M
We consider a system with K = 6 players and M = 6 arms. The optimal
action profile is a∗ = [2 1 1 6 4 5]. The mean reward for arm 3 is small
for all the players and thus the optimal allocation favors arm 1 for players
2 and 3. The considered system has ∆ = 0.05 and νmin = 0.1110. We set
T0 = 4.1 × 105, c2 = c3 = 104 and cε = 1.1 × 104. The value of ε is set to
10−5. Since it is possible for each player to play a distinct arm and receive
non-zero rewards, umaxj = max
m∈[M ]
µ̂j(m, 1) for all j ∈ [K]. The algorithm was
run for 10 epochs and the experiment was repeated for 85 iterations and the
accumulated regret averaged over the iterations.
Figure 3.1: Average accumulated regret as a function of time
3.5.2 K > M
We consider a system with K = 6 players and M = 3 arms. The optimal
action profile is a∗ = [2 3 2 1 1 3]. The considered system has ∆ = 0.0397
and νmin = 0.0757. We set T0 = 7.4×105, c2 = c3 = 2×104 and cε = 1.1×104.
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The value of ε is set to 10−4. Since it is required for 2 players to choose each
arm for all the players to receive non-zero rewards, umaxj = max
m∈[M ]
µ̂j(m, 2).
The algorithm was run for 10 epochs and the experiment was repeated for
100 iterations and the accumulated regret averaged over the iterations.
Figure 3.2: Average accumulated regret as a function of time
For the purpose of simulations in the case of K > M , we assume that the
number of players is known. When the number of players is not known, we
can estimate the number of players using methods similar to Algorithm 1 of
[14]. Additional details are provided in Appendix C.
From Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, we see that the average accumulated regret
grows sub-linearly with time. We can also observe that the average regret
incurred during the exploitation phase of each epoch is small as the matching




In this work, we have studied the uncoordinated spectrum access problem
using a multi-player multi-armed bandit framework where there is no central
control and users cannot communicate with each other. Under the considered
model, the reward distributions for the same channel may vary across the
users. Using this model, we have considered two settings - zero and non-zero
rewards on collisions. Under the zero rewards on collision model, we present
an algorithm that achieves average accumulated regret of order O(log T ) for
time horizon T , which is order optimal. In the second part of our work,
we consider the more practical non-zero rewards on collision model. Under
that setting, we present a policy that achieves average accumulated regret of
O(log2+δ T ) for time horizon T , for some 0 < δ < 1. The policy presented
for the non-zero rewards on collision setting is aimed towards small networks
and may be applied to bigger networks by division into subsystems. The





The exploration phase of the algorithm is for player j to obtain estimates of
mean rewards for the arms m ∈ [M ] and for all n ∈ [N ]. The estimated mean
rewards for each arm m are calculated separately by running a clustering
algorithm (Algorithm 3) on the rewards obtained while pulling arm m. The
estimated rewards µ̂j(m,n), for n = 1 to N , are calculated as the centroids
of the clusters sorted in descending order. The separability condition on
the mean rewards of arm m as a function of n (number of players choosing
that arm) provided in Section 3.1 is required to provide guarantees on the
clustering performance.
In section A.1, we provide some notation and the idea behind the proof
of Lemma 1. In section A.2, we provide an insight for the particular choice
of the separability condition. A proof sketch for Lemma 1 is provided in
subsection A.3.
A.1 Clustering
For readability, let R = {r1, . . . , rT} denote the set of rewards received by
some player j ∈ [K] for some arm m ∈ [M ] (rj,m in Algorithm 1). The
clustering algorithm (Algorithm 3) is run on R to obtain N cluster cen-
ters corresponding to the estimated rewards µ̂j(m,n) for n = 1 to N . Let
{Tn}n∈[N ] denote the true partition of R, i.e., if rt ∈ Tn, then rt is drawn
from the reward distribution corresponding to player j, arm m, and n num-
ber of players on the arm, with mean reward µj(m,n). For ease of notation,
µn and µj(m,n) are used interchangeably in this section. Let tn = |Tn|. Let
{Sn}n∈[N ] denote the clusters given by Algorithm 3. Let g(S) = 1|S|
∑
r∈S r




The cost of the clustering algorithm with respect to the true mean rewards
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is defined as Φ =
∑N
n=1 φ(µn,Sn).
The guarantees for the clustering algorithm provided in [23] (Lemma 5)
involve using a separability condition and a cost function (Section 1 of [23])
with respect to the sample means of the true partition (g(Tn) for n ∈ [N ]).
In our work, we use an approach similar to [23] to provide high probability
guarantees with respect to the true means of the distributions corresponding
to the clusters {µn}n∈[N ].
A.2 Separability Condition
We assume the following separability condition (stated in Section 3.1) on the
mean rewards of the arms:
|µj(m,n1)− µj(m,n2)| ≥ 4c′
√
σ2 + ε2 (A.1)
for all j ∈ [K], m ∈ [M ], n1, n2 ∈ [N ], ε2 ∈ (0, 1), where σ2 is the maximum
variance of the reward distributions across arms and c′ is a constant depen-
dent on K and M . In order to get to a separability condition similar to the
one in Definition 1 of [23], we first provide a lower bound on the number of
samples observed by player j during the exploration phase, drawn from the
reward distribution corresponding to arm m, with n players on the arm. The
following lemma is adapted from Lemma 4 of [26].
Lemma 9. If T0 = d 32M
K





samples drawn from the reward distribution corresponding
to arm m, with n players on the arm, during each epoch `.
Combining the above lemma with (A.1), we obtain a separability condition
similar to the one in Definition 1 of [23].
Lemma 10. For any player j and arm m, if the separability condition (A.1)
is satisfied, and for all n ∈ [N ] tn ≥ 16∆2 log
2MKN(N+1)
δ
, then for any n1, n2 ∈
[N ], with probability greater than 1− δ
2MKN(N+1)
, we have that









where c > 16 is a constant.
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The proof follows directly from Hoeffding’s inequality.
A.3 Proof Sketch of Lemma 1
We use techniques similar to those used in Section 3 of [23] to provide guar-
antees for the performance of the clustering algorithm. Let ∆n = |µn−g(Sn)|













i.e., ρnin + ρ
n
out captures the fraction of misclassifications in Sn with respect
to Tn. We first present the following lemma that is analogous to Lemma 2
of [23] that is useful in proving the required result.
Lemma 11. If γ < 1
4
, the following hold for all r ∈ Sn for all n ∈ [N ]
|r − µp| ≥ (
1
2
− 2γ)|µn − µp|, ∀p 6= n (A.3)
|r − µp| ≤
1
1− 4γ
|r − µn|. (A.4)
We now present the following lemmas that are high probability versions of
Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 of [23] respectively.
Lemma 12. If (A.2) is satisfied and an α-approximation algorithm returns
the set of centroids {g(S1, . . . , g(SN )}, then we have that ∀Tn, ∃p such that






and γ ≤ 2(α+1)
c
with probability 1 − κ1e−κ2` for
epoch ` (where κ1, κ2 > 0).
Lemma 13. If γ < 1
4




(1−4γ)2c2 with probability 1− κ3e
−κ4` for epoch ` (where κ3, κ4 > 0).
The proofs of the above lemmas use the techniques used in Lemma 1 and
Lemma 3 of [23] along with Hoeffding’s inequality.
The following lemma is analogous to Lemma 5 of [23], and the proof follows
directly by using the proofs of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 of [23].
Lemma 14. Given that the results of Lemma 7 and Lemma 9 hold, we have
that











Note that Φ is the sum of independent and bounded random variables.
Thus we can use Hoeffding’s inequality to upper bound Φ with high prob-





The matching phase algorithm is based on the work in [22], and the guaran-
tees provided there state that the action profile achieving the optimal sum
of utilities is played for a majority of the time. This is stated in Theorem
1 of [22] and the proof relies on the theory of resistance trees for regular
perturbed Markov processes [24].
Theorem 1 of [22] states that for an interdependent game on a finite action
space, the stochastically stable states of the dynamics presented in their pa-
per maximize the sum of utilities of all players. By definition of the stochas-
tically stable state, this state is played for a majority of time eventually. Our
goal is to use the proof of Theorem 1 of [22] to show that the stochastically
stable state of the matching phase dynamics maximizes the sum of utilities
of these players.
Our matching phase algorithm differs from the dynamics presented in [22]
in two aspects. Despite these two differences, we show that the proof tech-
nique of Theorem 1 of [22] can be adapted to our dynamics as well.
The first way in which our algorithm differs from that in [22] is that the
players in our algorithm do not directly observe their utilities. Instead they
estimate their utilities, and there is a probability of error of pε in this step.
We have shown in Section 3.4 that despite this difference, our matching
phase dynamics satisfies the conditions for a regular perturbed Markov chain.
Therefore, we can use the theory of regular perturbed Markov chains [24] to
analyze our algorithm.
The second way in which our dynamics differ from [22] is that our strategic
form game is not interdependent (Definition 1 of [22]). However, the only
place the interdependence property is used in the proof of Theorem 1 of [22] is
to characterize the recurrence classes of the unperturbed Markov process P 0.
We prove in the Lemma 3 that even though the interdependence property
does not hold for our dynamics, the recurrence classes of P 0 are the same as
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those obtained in Lemma 2 of [22].
Thus, we can use the proof of Theorem 1 of [22] to say that the stochas-
tically stable states of our matching phase algorithm maximize the sum of
utilities. Since we assume a unique optimal action profile, the state with the
baseline actions and utilities corresponding to the optimal action profile and
all players being content is the stochastically stable state. We bound the
probability of the optimal action profile not being identified at the end of the
matching phase in Lemma 4.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3
In the unperturbed process, if all the players are discontent, they remain
discontent with probability 1. Thus we have that D0 represents a single
recurrence class. In each state z ∈ C0, each player chooses their baseline
action, and since the utilities received would be the same as the baseline
utilities, each player stays content with probability 1. Thus we have that D0
and the singletons z ∈ C0 are recurrence classes.
To see that the above are the only recurrence classes, look at any state that
has at least one discontent player and at least one content player. We have
that the baseline actions and utilities of the content players are aligned (since
this is the unperturbed process). Consider one of the discontent players.
This player chooses an action at random and there is a positive probability
(bounded away from 0) of choosing the action of a content player. This would
cause the utility of the content player to become misaligned with his baseline
utility, thus leading to that player becoming discontent. This continues until
all players become discontent. Thus any such state cannot be a recurrent
state.
Now consider a state where all agents are content, but there is at least
one player j whose benchmark action and utility are not aligned. For the
unperturbed process, in the following step, the same action profile would be
played but this would cause player j to become discontent and it follows from
the previous argument that this leads to all players becoming discontent.
Thus we have that D0 and all singletons in C0 are the only recurrent states
of the unperturbed process.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Let ū denote the utilities of the players for the optimal action profile a∗.
The optimal state of the Markov chain is then z∗ = [a∗, ū, CK ]. Let the
distribution of the Markov chain after the first d = d0.5c2`1+δe plays be
φ. When the system is in state z, let the observed state as seen by the
players be z′. The observed state would differ from the true state only in the
utilities, due to the possibility that some players may calculate their utilities
incorrectly. The counting process in the matching phase of some epoch ` is
done for L = b0.5c2`(1+δ)c plays. In order to bound the probability of the
event {a∗ 6= a′}, we use the Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds for Markov chains
from [25], which is also used in [19]. The function f(z) considered here is
f(z) = 1{z=z∗,z′=z}.
This is the event when the current state is the optimal state and the state
is also observed correctly (i.e. the utilities are estimated correctly by all
players). If the optimal state is played for more than L/2 plays and the
utilities are calculated correctly by all the players for these plays, then the
optimal action profile would be played in the exploitation phase. Thus we
have that














In order to use the bounds in [25], we need E [f(z)], which can be computed
as
E [f(z)] = P{z = z∗, z′ = z}
= P{z = z∗}P{z′ = z|z = z∗}
(B.2)
We also have that
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This gives E [f(z)] = µf ≥ P{z = z∗}(1 −Kεc). And from the definition
of a stochastically stable state, we can choose an ε small enough such that
P{z = z∗}(1−Kεc) > p > 1/2. Define η = 1− 1
2µf
so that 0 < η < 1 when
µf > 1/2. Let T be the 1/8 mixing time of the Markov chain. Then from































Due to numerical considerations, we modify the state update step in the
matching phase of the algorithm. The state update step of the matching
phase algorithm is as follows:
If Sh,j = C and [aj, ûj] = [āh,j, ūh,j]:
Zh+1 = Zh.
If Sh,j = C and [aj, ûj] 6= [āh,j, ūh,j] or Sh,j = D, the new state
Zh+1 =
[aj, ûj, C] with prob ε1−ûj[aj, ûj, D] with prob 1− ε1−ûj . (C.1)
We modify the probabilities in (C.1) as εu
max
j −ûj and 1− εumaxj −ûj , instead
of ε1−ûj and 1 − ε1−ûj respectively. Here umaxj denotes the maximum util-
ity that can be received by player j, without reducing the utility of any
other player to zero. For example, when there are K = 6 players and
M = 6 arms, each player can occupy a separate arm and all the players
could receive non-zero utilities. Thus the value of umaxj of player j would be
umaxj = maxm∈[M ] µ̂j(m, 1). Consider the case when there are K = 6 players,
M = 3 arms and N = 2. In this case, it is not possible for any player j to
occupy an arm by himself without reducing the utilities of some other players
to zero. In this case, umaxj = maxm∈[M ] µ̂j(m, 2).
For the purpose of simulations in the case of K > M , we assume that
the number of players in the system is known in order to calculate umaxj for
each player j. If the number of players is not known, we can adapt the
method from the ‘Musical Chairs’ algorithm in [14] to estimate the number
of players. Note that in the musical chairs algorithm, each player knows
the number of collisions (the event where one or more other players also
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choose the same arm) that occur and this is used to estimate the number of
players in the system. However, in our setting, players cannot observe the
number of collisions as we allow for non-zero rewards on collisions. Instead,
we can provide a separate phase in the beginning of the algorithm for the
each player to estimate the total number of players in the system. This can
be done by each player choosing an arm uniformly, and playing the chosen
arm for a certain number of time units to estimate the number of players on
that arm. This way, the number of collisions that occur during this phase
can be obtained with high probability. This is similar to the method used to
estimate the utilities of the players in the matching phase of the algorithm.
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[9] N. Korda, B. Szörényi, and L. Shuai, “Distributed clustering of linear
bandits in peer to peer networks,” in Journal of Machine Learning Re-
search Workshop and Conference Proceedings, vol. 48. International
Machine Learning Societ, 2016, pp. 1301–1309.
39
[10] N. Evirgen and A. Kose, “The effect of communication on nonco-
operative multiplayer multi-armed bandit problems,” in 2017 16th
IEEE International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications
(ICMLA). IEEE, 2017, pp. 331–336.
[11] O. Avner and S. Mannor, “Multi-user lax communications: a multi-
armed bandit approach,” in IEEE INFOCOM 2016-The 35th Annual
IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE,
2016, pp. 1–9.
[12] D. Kalathil, N. Nayyar, and R. Jain, “Decentralized learning for multi-
player multiarmed bandits,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 2331–2345, 2014.
[13] O. Avner and S. Mannor, “Concurrent bandits and cognitive radio net-
works,” in Joint European Conference on Machine Learning and Knowl-
edge Discovery in Databases. Springer, 2014, pp. 66–81.
[14] J. Rosenski, O. Shamir, and L. Szlak, “Multi-player bandits–a musi-
cal chairs approach,” in International Conference on Machine Learning,
2016, pp. 155–163.
[15] A. Anandkumar, N. Michael, A. K. Tang, and A. Swami, “Distributed
algorithms for learning and cognitive medium access with logarithmic
regret,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 29,
no. 4, pp. 731–745, 2011.
[16] E. Boursier and V. Perchet, “SIC-MMAB: synchronisation involves com-
munication in multiplayer multi-armed bandits,” in Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems, 2019, pp. 12 048–12 057.
[17] L. Besson and E. Kaufmann, “Multi-player bandits revisited,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1711.02317, 2017.
[18] H. Tibrewal, S. Patchala, M. K. Hanawal, and S. J. Darak, “Dis-
tributed learning and optimal assignment in multiplayer heterogeneous
networks,” in IEEE INFOCOM 2019-IEEE Conference on Computer
Communications. IEEE, 2019, pp. 1693–1701.
[19] I. Bistritz and A. Leshem, “Distributed multi-player bandits-a game
of thrones approach,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, 2018, pp. 7222–7232.
[20] E. Boursier, V. Perchet, E. Kaufmann, and A. Mehrabian, “A practical
algorithm for multiplayer bandits when arm means vary among players,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.01239, 2019.
40
[21] M. Bande and V. V. Veeravalli, “Multi-user multi-armed bandits for
uncoordinated spectrum access,” in 2019 International Conference on
Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC). IEEE, 2019,
pp. 653–657.
[22] J. R. Marden, H. P. Young, and L. Y. Pao, “Achieving pareto optimality
through distributed learning,” SIAM Journal on Control and Optimiza-
tion, vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 2753–2770, 2014.
[23] C. Tang and C. Monteleoni, “On Lloyd’s algorithm: New theoretical in-
sights for clustering in practice,” in Artificial Intelligence and Statistics,
2016, pp. 1280–1289.
[24] H. P. Young, “The evolution of conventions,” Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society, pp. 57–84, 1993.
[25] K.-M. Chung, H. Lam, Z. Liu, and M. Mitzenmacher, “Chernoff-
Hoeffding bounds for Markov chains: Generalized and simplified,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1201.0559, 2012.
[26] M. Bande and V. V. Veeravalli, “Multi-user multi-armed bandits for
uncoordinated spectrum access,” arXiv e-prints, p. arXiv:1807.00867,
Jul 2018.
41
